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Governance gives life to an organization by establishing the rules that shape organi-
zational action. Structures of governance rest on stakeholder engagement, particularly
on how stakeholders assess the prospects for earning a return by committing their
specialized resources to the organization. Once formalized, governance structures and
processes can resist change. Yet, under special circumstances, some stakeholders that
are a party to an organization may seek to adapt governance in response to changes in
the external environment that surrounds the organization. Adaptation often requires
renegotiation: who has claims on the organization and who gets what? In this article we
analyze the relationship between the institutional change that drives adaptation and
the outcome of renegotiation. We draw on institutional economics and organization
theory to identify four pathways of governance adaptation: continuity, architectural
change, enfranchisement change, and redistribution. We call for further theoretical and
empirical research on governance adaptation and its implications for organizational
value creation and capture.
Forming an organization requires establishing
rules about who will be in charge, how leadership
turnoverwill occur, whowill be involved in critical
decisions, how gains will be distributed, and who
will bear the risk of failure. These rules, which
make up the organization’s governance structure,
give life and continuity to the organization as an
entity separate from its members and from other
persons and entities. To foster cooperation, gov-
ernance structures include safeguards to protect
the interests and investments of key stakeholders
(Blair & Stout, 1999; Klein, Mahoney, McGahan, &
Pitelis, 2013). For example, the rules on how aCEO
is selected, what the length of the CEO’s term is,
how key decisions are made, and how compensa-
tion is determined are difficult to change, even by
the top management team, without consultation,
due process, and negotiation (Cyert &March, 1963;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
When do changes in the external environment
(EE) compel adaptation in an organization’s gov-
ernance structure? To make this question tracta-
ble,we focus in thisarticle on changesoriginating
in the institutional environment (IE). While the EE
generally includes technology, demand, and in-
stitutional shocks that affect the firm’s behavior
and performance, the IE refers to the specific for-
mal and informal legal, political, and social
structures and processes in the EE that frame
organizational governance structures (Mahoney,
2005; North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). We are par-
ticularly interested in how firms respond to un-
anticipated change in the IE.
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For example, De Beers, the South African min-
ing company, operated historically under gover-
nance rules designed under and aligned with
apartheid. The IE changed in the early 1990s with
the end of apartheid and the election into power
of Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress
(Rantete, 1998). Subsequently, new regulations
were implemented mandating that corporations
enfranchise blacks in ownership, leadership, and
operational decisions. De Beers responded first
by adapting its strategyandoperations to thenew
IE, appointing a black managing director in late
2005, and offering equity to black investors (Reed,
2005). This led to newly enfranchised stake-
holders with different control and ownership
rights—a change in the firm’s governance struc-
ture. Adaptation was successful, in part, because
the new and old enfranchised stakeholders
appeared to share the overriding objective of re-
building the South African economy and society.
In the face of radical legal and social change,
De Beers adapted to ensure the organization’s
survival as South Africa was transformed.
In other cases firms take different paths in re-
sponse to changes in the IE. As explained by
Chandler (1962), many firms during the 1920s ei-
ther failed or were slow to respond to advances in
telecommunications and railroads that enabled
greater levels of diversification and decentral-
ization. The pioneering firms that adopted the
new multidivisional or “M-form” structure—most
notably, General Motors (GM), DuPont, Standard
Oil, and Sears—had access to strategies that led
them to become the largest and most successful
companies of their era.
Modern examples of change in the IE include
the adoption of international climate-change
agreements, the implementation of patent laws,
and new international and domestic public policy
regimes. In some cases government and private
actors attempt to influence organizations directly
(e.g., to includeblack citizens in the governance of
organizations in postapartheid South Africa). In
other cases the effects are indirect (e.g., when
cancellation of a pending international trade
agreement allows a firm to make decisions with-
out considering foreign actors). When these IE
changes are substantial, they compel change not
only in firm’s strategies and processes but also in
the governance structure that surrounds those
strategies and processes.
Quoting Chester Barnard (1938), Williamson
described adaptation as “the central problem of
organization” (1996: 299). Markets adapt continu-
ously, with adjustments coordinated by the price
system within a given institutional framework
(Hayek, 1945). In an organization, however, adap-
tation is more difficult since it requires a degree
of central coordination and control (Barnard, 1938;
Williamson, 1996).1 The problem becomes more
complex when required adaptation challenges
the authority of the organization’s core stake-
holder groups. This situation of adaptation in
governance raises specific challenges about how
enfranchised stakeholders protect and pursue
their interests and what pathways to change
become available, given the interplay between
different stakeholder groups.
Scholarship inmanagement, corporate finance,
and contract economics has substantially
addressed the nature and effects of governance
(Foss & Mankhe, 2002; Hendry & Kiel, 2004;
Williamson, 1996), but researchers have not dealt
as fully with issues of governance change. A key
fact about governance is that governance ar-
rangements typically include procedures about
how the firm’s assets will be liquated in cases of
financial distress and how the residual valuewill
be distributed to shareholders. However, com-
prehensive organizational failure is a dramatic
and costly event that stakeholders seek to avoid
except in exceptional circumstances. A more ef-
fective, efficient, and valuable alternative is to
change the governance structure of an organiza-
tion in response to a change in the IE. Under
external pressure, key stakeholders may renego-
tiate the firm’s governance arrangements to sup-
port theorganization’ssurvival, even if this leaves
them worse off than before. For instance, a firm’s
founders may agree to the subordination of their
original ownership shares in exchange for in-
vestment capital that keeps the firm going (Rajan,
2012). Unions may agree to renegotiate binding
wage agreements or benefit packages. In each
instance a stakeholder group accepts a worse
deal as superior to no deal, and liquidation is
averted. The threat to the firm’s survival leads
to renegotiation, rather than to the distribution
of residual value to shareholders.
The value of adopting the firm’s governance
structure is particularly high when the external
stress comes from unanticipated changes to the
1Williamson (1991a) referred to these as “autonomous” and
“cooperative” adaptation, respectively (see also Williamson,
1991b).
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IE. While the role of the EE has been recognized
as fundamental to strategic management since
Porter (1980), interest in change in the IE has re-
cently intensified (Henisz, 2000; North, 1990). This
interest ismotivated, in part, by a recognition that
failure to adapt to IE changes may threaten the
ongoing existence of the organization. We do not
seek to explain all aspects of governance but,
rather, focus specifically on the process of adap-
tation itself. Similarly, we are not investigating
all elements of organizational change but those
specific changes instead that an organization’s
governing stakeholders negotiate, accept, and
act on in the face of threats to the entire organi-
zation’s existence.
As we explain below, several important recent
examples of organizational restructuring and evo-
lution are best understood as governance adapta-
tion in response to changes in the IE. We discuss
architectural change at De Beers, Dollar General,
and Enron; enfranchisement change in the phar-
maceutical industry; redistribution by companies
faced with environmental disaster; and continuity
at JPMorgan Chase after the 2007-2008 financial
crisis. These examples illustrate that firms do not
respond to IE changes in the same way.
To understand the pathways of governance
adaptation, we integrate insights from organiza-
tion theory (Scott, 2008) with those from in-
stitutional economics (Williamson, 1993). Like
Scott, we view organizations as “coalitions of
shifting interest groups that develop goals by
negotiation; the structure of the coalition, its ac-
tivities, and its outcomes are strongly influenced
by environmental factors” (1987: 23; see also Scott,
2008). Our analysis deals with cases in which
some agents can resist legitimate demands for
adaptation following environmental change but
where the ability to resist is limited. For instance,
a CEO may not be able to control the process by
fiat because the CEO’s decision is outside the
“zone of acceptance” (Barnard, 1938; Simon, 1947).
The situations that we seek to analyze may put
the CEO’s role in jeopardy. Adaptation involves
a complex negotiation or renegotiation among
different enfranchised actors and groups about
the governance authority and rewards.
In this conceptualization, organizations are open
systems in which the relevant actors, such as the
CEO, board members, employees, shareholders,
and managers, compare the benefits and costs
of the organization’s existing governance structure
to available alternatives. Adaptive responses to
environmental change involve renegotiationamong
the key enfranchised actors, who try to maintain or
improve on their prior interests and positions. How-
ever, achieving this outcome is almost never possi-
ble for all enfranchised actors. Negotiations may
also proceed by threatening stakeholders who seek
to avoid adaptation with future expulsion or re-
duction in status. Changing the governance struc-
ture of organizations requires the collective action
of essential stakeholders to find a negotiated
arrangement that each sees as superior to
nonengagement.
Our framework begins with the institu-
tional economics literature on collective action
(Libecap, 1989; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990). This
literature considers how organizations emerge to
coordinate the contributions of essential stake-
holders (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Grossman &
Hart, 1986). Thecanonical problemin this tradition
is how the essential parties to value creation
achieve agreement on the terms by which they
will be governed organizationally. From orga-
nization contingency theory (Galbraith, 1973;
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Scott, 1987), we hold that
resilient organizations are those that better adapt
to their environment. Our focus is on how orga-
nizational actors impede or facilitate adaptation
following institutional change. In doing so we
address these fundamental questions: Who is in,
who is out, and who gets what under an adapted
governance structure?
Our main contribution is the identification of
four broad pathways of governance adaptation:
continuity, architectural change, enfranchisement
change, and redistribution. Before discussing
these four pathways, we first define terms and
establish the key ideas on which our argument
rests. We then turn to conceptual background. Fi-
nally, we develop a series of theoretical claims
linking these constructs.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT
The stakeholders in an organization’s gover-
nance structure are those actors who control re-
sources and capabilities that are essential to the
organization’s function and performance. As we
explain below, governance adaptation may take
place when a change in the IE threatens the core
organizational rules on who within the organiza-
tion makes decisions and who gets what. In other
words, a shock to the IE compels governance
adaptation when it changes the relevance of
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stakeholder resources and capabilities. Of
course, many changes to personnel and practices
do not constitute governance adaptation. An or-
ganization’s employees, for example, may choose
to exit if an authoritarianCEOdeclares terms that
substantially exceed employees’ zone of accep-
tance (Simon, 1947), but this is not governance
adaptation unless the departures prevent the or-
ganization from functioning. Adapting organiza-
tional governance structures is difficult because
some stakeholders may not want change even
when a major institutional or social event—for
example, the overthrow of apartheid in South
Africa, the threat of climate change, or the rise of
social media—requires change and motivates
other internal actors to pursue such change.
Key Terms and Concepts
Governance structures. Governance structures
are the formal and informal rules and procedures
that control resource accumulation, development,
and allocation; the distribution of the organiza-
tion’s production; and the resolution of the con-
flicts of interest associated with group behavior
(Blair & Stout, 1999; Chandler, 1962; Williamson,
1985). General rules arise from commercial codes
and corporate statutes, but owners and creditors
can often specify unique rules via the company
charter, articles of incorporation, and similar
documents (Hansmann, 2006). Less formal rules
arise from custom or emerge as part of the orga-
nization’s culture to shape processes and rou-
tines. Collectively, governance rules establish
the organization as an entity distinct from the in-
dividuals whose activities make up the firm.2
We seek to distinguish between an organiza-
tion’s governance structure and its activities. An
organization is defined by its governance struc-
ture, which we identify as the fundamental rules
about who is in, who is out, and who gets what.
Organizations arise to pursue opportunities that
individuals cannot accomplish independently
(Barnard, 1938; Simon, 1947). For an organization
to be successful, the benefits of joint production
mustexceed thecostsarising fromhazardssuchas
free-riding (actors who do not pull their weight in
the expectation that others will do so) and oppor-
tunism (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Williamson,
1985). Governance structures attempt to mitigate
thesehazards bydesignating certain stakeholders
as legitimate holders of decision rights, which we
call “enfranchisement,” and by specifying how the
value created by joint production will be distrib-
uted.3 This specification, which we discuss in de-
tail below, is important because expectations
about claimancy induce stakeholders with critical
resources and capabilities to become enfran-
chised. Stakeholder enfranchisement and claim-
ancyareat the foundationof governancestructure.
Once governance structure is established, the
regular governance activities of the organization are
enabled. Governance activities include events such
asmeetings of the boards of directors and operations
such as the implementation of decision-making pro-
tocols and compensation programs. Organizational
governance is distinct from organizational strategy,
culture, routines, capabilities, and innovation, which
take place within the framework established by the
organization’s governance structure. Governance is
often described as the “rules of the game,” within
which thegameisplayed.Putdifferently,governance
operates at a higher level of analysis than strategy,
organization, and the like (Williamson, 2000).
Enfranchised stakeholders. Enfranchised stake-
holders are organizational actors with the de facto
ability to influence decision making and, hence,
organizational governance. These stakeholders
achieve their status as enfranchised because
they contribute resources and capabilities that
are central to the organization’s value creation.
In an earlier article, following Blair and Stout
(1999), we (Klein, Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis,
2010) identified enfranchised stakeholders as
those that coinvest specialized assets, capabil-
ities, and resources through the organization to
create value through joint production (see also
Hoskisson, Gambeta, Green, & Li, 2018). In cor-
porations such stakeholders normally include
the main suppliers, employees, managers, and
the CEO. Customers and the community can also
2In corporate law this separation is called “asset partition-
ing” (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2000).
3
“Governance is themeansbywhich to infuseorder, thereby
mitigating conflict and realizing mutual gain” (Williamson,
2005: 3; see also Commons, 1931). In this article changes in the
IE lead to new conflicts among stakeholders, and governance
adaptation via enfranchisement and/or claimancy rights in-
fuses a new order to realize mutual gain among stakeholders,
thereby creating economic value. Below we argue that the
enfranchisement of stakeholder groups rests on the confer-
ring of decision rights, which may be both specified and
residual. Some stakeholder groups may be only weakly
enfranchised—that is, by holding only minor, specified de-
cision rights.
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affect decision making through their choices and ac-
tions.Enfranchisementdescribeswhoisinandwhois
out of the organization’s internal decision-making
process and, hence, is a foundational element of
governance structure.
The means of stakeholder enfranchisement may
vary. In someinstances itmayevenbe legislatedby
the IE. For example, under Anglo-American corpo-
rate law, equity owners of companies are guaran-
teed enfranchisement via the right to vote for board
members and to ratify some executive decisions.
Under German law, organized labor is guaranteed
board representation and is therefore an enfran-
chised stakeholder group in every public company.
In Norway a certain percentage of board seats is
reserved for women. In all three countries the
stakeholder groups of equity owners, labor, and
women may also be enfranchised in the gover-
nance of specific organizations by other means,
such as organizational commitments, norms, and
informal practices. Aswenoted inKlein et al. (2010),
de facto stakeholder enfranchisement can differ
from the de jure arrangements specified by corpo-
rate law. The effective rights and responsibilities of
enfranchised groups can be determined by custom,
by legal practice, and by regulation, as well as by
the provisions of corporate law.
Under uncertainty, enfranchisement is particu-
larly important because enfranchised actors have
residual rights of control—the rights to make de-
cisions about how to use the firm’s resources in
conditions not specified by prior agreement (Hart,
1995; Klein et al., 2012). The transaction cost eco-
nomics literature and property rights economics
literatureemphasize these residual rightsof control
but focus on formal, de jure control rights. Over
time, stakeholder groups that are not formally en-
franchised may become enfranchised de facto fol-
lowing a change in the IE.
The governance of an organization also includes
rules on the distribution of jointly created value.We
define these rules as the organization’s claimancy
rights. These identify who gets what through com-
pensation, various payments, and residual rights.
All claims on a corporation—not only residual
rights—are the subject of governance rules. Exam-
ples of claims include employee salaries, customer
discounts on prices, dividend payments, and part-
nership claims.
Claimancy rights. Claimancy rights establish
which individuals and groups can capture the
value createdby the organization. Value is created
by coinvestment by all stakeholders in shared
goods and services. These rights can be fixed
(specified) or contingent on firm performance (re-
sidual). The right to receivedividendsand the right
to appropriate capital gains, for example, are es-
sential claimancy rights accruing to equity
holders. Debt holders have other claimancy rights,
including the right to interest payments and the
right of asset appropriation under bankruptcy.
Employees and suppliers have claimancy rights
over wages, salaries, and factor payments. Other
stakeholders may also have claimancy rights,
given the legal, political, and social conditions in
which the firm operates. Some stakeholders, such
as an organization’s volunteers and geographic
neighbors, may be enfranchised in elements of
governance but have no claimancy rights. Claim-
ancy rights matter for governance because they
create an incentive for stakeholders to become
enfranchised in an organization. It is through
claimancy that stakeholders receive a return on
the investment of specialized assets, capabilities,
and resources in the organization.
Together, enfranchisement and claimancy
rights are foundational to an organization’s gov-
ernance structure. Some enfranchised stakehold-
ers contribute more to the organization and, thus,
may have more decision-making authority than
others, as well as greater claimancy rights. As
noted above, those stakeholders with residual
rights of control—the rights tomake decisions in
situations not covered by prior agreement—play
a particularly strong role. The size of claims
depends, in part, on which claims are fixed,
which claims are contingent on earnings, and
how claims are ordered in the event of financial
distress. In other words, governance structure
depends on which individuals have rights and
claims—and which rights and claims they
have.4
Governance structure adaptation may fail
if a critical enfranchised stakeholder group
4It is conventional in the governance literature and finance
literature to distinguish residual control rights from residual
income rights. This distinction is particularly important for
governance adaptation,which relates to structural rather than
operational issues. Claimancy rights can be restructured and
reallocated by those who have decision rights—that is, by the
organization’s enfranchised stakeholders. Claimancy, thus, is
usually subordinate to enfranchisement, in the sense that en-
franchised stakeholders can change claimancy rules. While
enfranchisement can also occur through demands for claim-
ancy, these demands may not materialize, allowing us to dis-
tinguish the categories for analytical purposes.
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threatens to withdraw its cooperation (Hirschman,
1970). For example, labor unions may initiate a
strike if management fails to meet their demands
for better working conditions (Hill & Jones, 1992).
Governance structure adaptation can attenuate
the likelihood of a strike by providing safe-
guards such as having more insider board
members elected by employees of the firm who
are making firm-specific investments (Osterloh
& Frey, 2006).
Failure occurs when the joint value created by
the organization is too small to compensate each
stakeholder sufficiently to ensure continued par-
ticipation by the stakeholders (Brandenburger &
Nalebuff, 1997). Averting such a threat occurs
when, all else being equal, each enfranchised
stakeholder has claimancy rights that may
not represent the entirety of the stakeholder’s
added value but that exceed the stakeholder’s
opportunity costs (Brandenburger & Stuart,
1996).5
In our analysis, governance encompasses a set
of claimancy rights established before the orga-
nization is set up over value that is realized af-
terward. The gap between ex ante claimancy
rights and the ex post rules by which claims are
distributed reflects, in part, how the organiza-
tion’s governance structure allocates risk among
organizational actors. Once governance struc-
tures have been established, some stakeholders
may seek renegotiation either to create an in-
centive for future joint investment or to adjust for
resolution of risk. The legitimacy of such claims
may rest, for example, on differences between
stakeholders in sophistication, experience, infor-
mation, awareness of consequences, capacity for
risk, and/or opportunity for coinvestment.6
Just as enfranchisement and claimancy are
central to governance, changes in enfranchise-
ment and claimancy are central to governance
adaptation. Claimancy rights may require re-
negotiation when a change in the IE leads to
the perception by some newly enfranchised
stakeholders that the existing pattern of rights is
inequitable.7 Once the firm is in operation and
value is realized through the sale of a product or
service (Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 2007), actual
payouts may be different than expected.8 Often,
the perception of inequity follows a change in the
IE that enfranchises new actors. If the perceived
inequity is large enough, the existing structure
of claimancy rights—along with other aspects of
the organization’s governance structure—may
require an overhaul.
In this article we focus on the adaptation of
previously established governance structures
that aremotivated by changes in the environment
surrounding the organization.9 Such change can
lead some stakeholders to question if the current
structure is aligned with their extant or antici-
pated contribution to firm value and their share of
this value. Shifts in the IE can be fully exogenous
to the organization and compel its adaptation
(although, of course, firms can and do try to in-
fluence the IE through lobbying, litigation, public
relations, and other forms of nonmarket strategy
[Henisz & Zelner, 2012]). Exogenous shifts in the IE
may arise from many sources, including law,
government, and culture. One example is a
change in customs or ideology, such as when the
British vote for (Br)exit from the European Union
(EU) led many British-based EU banks to be un-
certain about their right to operate in the United
Kingdomwithout a formal subsidiary (as opposed
to the branchesmany use). Another is a change in
intellectual property regimes, such as when the
World Trade Organization compelled the imple-
mentation of patent laws in emerging-market
countries where knowledge capital had not pre-
viously been privately held. Another is a change
in government policies, such as when deregula-
tion designed for a purpose that does not relate
5An analysis of individuals entering and exiting organiza-
tions can be found in the extant organization theory literature
under the concept of an “inducements-contribution balance”
(Barnard, 1938; Simon, 1947, 1952).
6We distinguish challenges to claimancy rights of the or-
ganization’sgovernancestructure fromnegotiations that occur
within the structure of a firm’s claimancy rights. We focus on
governance over claimancy rights, rather than the specific
allocation that occurs—changes in the rules of the game, not
the play of the game.
7By invoking equity, we are referring not to a specific nor-
mative theory of outcomes but, rather, to the (subjective) per-
ceptions among organizational actors concerning the
enforcement of prior agreements. In other words, claimancy
rights are established when the organization is created
based on expectations about value cocreation and the dis-
tribution of that value among stakeholders.
8This difference happens, for example, if below-average
labor productivity or unanticipated outsourcing opportunities
lead employees to receive a lower share of cocreated value
than expected under employment contracts (Rousseau, 1989).
9In other cases governance structures may adapt because
the initial governance structure was perceived to be ineff-
icient, ineffective, or unfair and parties only discovered this
over time.
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to a particular organization’s agenda influences
the organization nonetheless.10
Such shifts in the EE compel not only changes in
strategy but also, in many cases, changes in
governance structure. For example, Oxley (1999)
examined how the IE affects governance struc-
tures of interfirm alliances and the governance
choice between equity alliances and contractual
alliances under differing regimes of intellectual
property protection and other national insti-
tutional features. Empirically, firms adopt more
hierarchical governancemodeswhen intellectual
property rights protections areweaker. Therefore,
a more complete understanding of governance
structure choice requires analysis of the interplay
of the IE and the mechanisms of governance.
The Problem of Collective Action
To be successful in creating value, organiza-
tions must resolve collective action problems
among critical stakeholders, such as aggregating
diverse interests and goals, providing incentives
for participation, and coordinating activities. In-
deed, the problem of collective action is at the
heart of organizational governance, because the
purpose of an organization is to jointly deploy
the specialized assets, capabilities, and resources
of enfranchised stakeholders, each of whom can-
not realize value independently. The problem that
is resolved by establishing the organization is co-
ordination among enfranchised stakeholders to
create joint value.
The institutional economics literature on prop-
erty rights provides key insights on how resolu-
tion may occur in any collective action problem,
including the problem of governance adaptation.
Organizations such as firms are communities
of stakeholders. We submit that the problem of
organizational governance is analogous to the
problems identified in the literature on in-
stitutions and property rights, which is how to
achieve agreement among stakeholders on a set
of rules that will lead to the joint creation of value.
As we aim to show in this article, management
scholarship can benefit by importing insights re-
garding collective action developed in the field
of political science.
Ostrom (1990) showed that local communities
such as organizations face problems governing
“common-pool” resources. Common-pool re-
sources are a subset of “public goods.” They are
goods that are rivalrous in consumption (one
person’s use prevents others’ use) but non-
excludable (unauthorized users can consume
them). Examples from the public domain include
fisheries, forests, and irrigation systems. The
problems that arise in governing common-pool re-
sources includedisputes about pollution; questions
over theuseof land,water, andother resources; and
concerns about how governmental resources will
be deployed. Unlike other resources, these cannot
be managed simply by assigning ownership titles,
because common-pool resources belong “to all” in
a community; they cannot easily be partitioned into
appropriable pieces. Similarly, the enfranchised
stakeholders in the organization—an important
form of community—contribute specialized re-
sources that create goods that are “public” within
the organization, in the sense that they are acces-
sible to the organization’s participants.
According to Ostrom (1990), small communities
often resolve problems about the use of common-
pool resources neither through top-down govern-
ment control nor through markets and the price
mechanism. Rather, close-knit groups rely on
complex, layered, and nuanced mechanisms of
coordination, collaboration, and communication
to identify a path forward. These processes are
also characteristic of firms, which rely on internal
governance structures to determine how organi-
zational actors will obtain access to valuable in-
ternal goods that arise from collective action.
Ostrom (2010) calls these layers of interaction
“polycentric” governance. Polycentric systems in-
volve multiple actors and centers of decision mak-
ing that function with interdependence (Kivleniece
& Quelin, 2012). The approach is costly because it
requires intensive coordination (Williamson, 1985).
However, Ostrom (1990: 180) has shown that the
benefits of polycentric systems outweigh the costs
when organizational governance satisfies the fol-
lowing design rules:
• Clear boundaries and memberships: The rel-
evant actors and the resources under con-
sideration are clearly specified. It is well
known who gets to decide about what.
10Changes to the IE are not necessarily exogenous to all
firms. Efforts to influence legal, regulatory, political, andsocial
conditions may be as important to firms as efforts to influence
their competitiveand technological environments (Moore,Bell,
Filatotchev, & Rasheed, 2012; Oh & Oetzel, 2011). For example,
firms seek to influence legal, regulatory, and political in-
stitutions through lobbying, rent seeking, and other activities
(Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005; Garud, Hardy, & Maguire,
2007, Klein et al., 2010).
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• Congruence between appropriation and pro-
vision rules and local conditions: Rules for
value appropriation (what we call stake-
holder enfranchisement) and provision (what
we call claimancy rights) must be aligned
with each other and with local economic
conditions.
• Peermonitoring:Rulesmust be self-enforcing
through transparency and close monitoring
of enfranchised stakeholders by each other.
• Graduated sanctions: Actors who violate or-
ganizational standards should face sanc-
tions that are appropriate for the violation
and not unnecessarily severe, except in the
case of repeat violations.
• Conflict resolution mechanisms: Members of
the community shouldhaveaccess to reliable
courts, arbitration boards, or internal dispute
resolution systems that are perceived as
transparent and equitable.
Firm-level examples of common-pool resources
include organizational knowledge, brand, cor-
porate culture, reputation, and capabilities. Or-
ganizations face multiple challenges in the
governance of these resources, the first of which
is the foundational problem of attracting stake-
holders into enfranchisement. Subsequently, or-
ganizationsmust develop governance structures
that determine how jointly produced resources
will be deployed, and they must adapt these to
changes in the IE that affect the calculus of
stakeholder enfranchisement. Ostrom’s (1990)
design rules constitute principles of effective
adaptation. Belowweanalyze the implications of
these design rules for the problem of adaptation
in organizational governance.11 Before taking on
this task, however, we evoke a second set of in-
sights originating in Libecap (1989) on change in
the allocation of rights.
Libecap’s (1989) analysis of how property rights
change in the public domain generates insights
that relate to adaptation in private organizational
governance. Writing about political governance
in local communities, Libecap examined eco-
nomic hazards that stymie adaptation and de-
scribed the characteristics of bargaining over
access to critical resources. Central elements in
Libecap’s analysis of community politics are lob-
bying, distributional conflicts, and asymmetric
information, all of which may block changes that
would promote overall welfare. Of course, these
politics are also characteristic of organizations,
especially after operation begins. Libecap was
particularly interested in resistance to change
when certain private and government actors per-
ceived that they would not gain personally from
adaptation, even when the proposed change
would benefit the community. We incorporate in-
sights from his analysis to understand why some
organizational actors resist change, even when
adaptation is compelled by changes in the IE. Or-
ganizational stakeholder groups are analogous to
the private actors, and organizational executives
to governmental actors, in Libecap’s analysis.
Libecap’s (1989) qualitative studies of change in
political governance structures identified factors
that distinguish success from failure. Thepurpose
was not to investigate normal change in leader-
ship but, rather, in the rules of governance per se.
Two cases stand out. The first was a successful
negotiation among miners over the rules govern-
ing who could explore where and how jointly
identified veins of valuable gold and silver would
be allocated. The secondwas a failed negotiation
among landowners over the rules governing how
the oil flowing under the landwould be extracted.
Through comprehensive analysis, Libecap (1989)
identified factors that explain whether a group of
enfranchised actors can agree on adaptation in
governance rules:
• Size of economic gains: The greater the size of
the aggregate expected (value creation) gains
from the institutional change, the more likely
a political agreement can be reached that
makes enough influential parties better off so
that governance adaptation can proceed.
• Number of coalitions: The greater the number
of competing groups with a stake in the new
definition of property rights, the more likely
distributional conflicts will delay or block
change and, thus, the less likely governance
adaptation can proceed.
• Coalition heterogeneity: The greater the het-
erogeneity of the bargaining parties (in terms
of production costs, resources, wealth, and
political experience), the more difficult it is
to form a winning political coalition. This
makes adjustments in property rights more
difficult and, thus, less likely governance
adaptation can proceed.
• Persistence in information asymmetries: The
greater the severity of the information asym-
metry problems concerning, say, economic
valuation, the greater the disputes in bar-
gaining and, thus, the less likely governance
adaptation can proceed.
11Indeed, some of Ostrom’s (1990) design rules at the IE level
(e.g., monitoring and conflict resolution mechanisms) overlap
with Williamson’s (1996) mechanisms of governance at the
organizational level.
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• Concentration of wealth: The greater the
concentration of wealth under the proposed
property rights allocation, the greater the
likelihood of political opposition and, thus,
the less likely that governance adaptation
can proceed.
While these ideas about governance adapta-
tion were developed in the context of property
rights disputes among communities, we main-
tain that they apply to organizational gov-
ernance structures and processes as well.
Ostrom’s (1990) design principles describe the
conditions under which organizations success-
fully construct governance and can achieve
governance adaptation.12 Libecap’s (1989) crite-
ria describe how stakeholder characteristics in-
fluence governance adaptation. Both the Ostrom
and Libecap frameworks emphasize who is in,
who is out, and who gets what. The key issues
surrounding successful governance adaptation
in response to IE change are the interests of en-
franchised stakeholders (who can affect decision
making and, hence, who is in andwho is out) and
claimancy rights (who gets what parts of the
jointly created value).13 Figure 1 summarizes
these relationships.
As shown in Figure 1, each of Ostrom’s design
principles and Libecap’s adaptation criteria re-
lates to stakeholder enfranchisement and/or
claimancy rights.14 Ostrom’s work (1990) shows
that the central challenge of governance is in
specifying which stakeholders are engaged in
various processes and in achieving agreement
ex ante on claimancy rules that are exercised
ex post. The exclusion of some potential stake-
holders is essential to the agreement among the
remaining enfranchised stakeholders on the
claimancy rules. Libecap’s work (1989) empha-
sizes the challenge of sustaining coherent gover-
nance arrangements ex post, after the results of
the organization’s operations resolve—at least in
part—the generation of value by the organization,
the risks borne by various stakeholders, and the
results that occur after the claimancy rules are
exercised. As Libecap explained, some stake-
holders may seek to participate in governance
while others prefer to exit. Libecap’s framework
also shows that the initial bargaining position of
each enfranchised stakeholder typically focuses
on improvement from established arrangements.
Olson’s (1965) analysis demonstrates that stake-
holder group size is particularly important to the
effective governance of collective goods by at-
tenuating free-riding.
Both Libecap (1989) and Ostrom (1990) empha-
sized that during the bargaining process stake-
holders may recognize that an organization’s
profile may be fundamentally affected if other
stakeholders exit and enter the governance pro-
cess. Stakeholders who perceive the organization
asattractivewill try to anticipate howmuch value
the organization will create and how that value
will be distributed. Negotiations may reflect the
complex positions of various coalitions of stake-
holders, each seeking to negotiate prospective
claimancy rights and each seeking to threaten
competing coalitions with bad outcomes. Thus,
the complexity of governance adaptation re-
flects the broad range of possible outcomes of
negotiations over stakeholder enfranchisement
and claimancy rights. This stands in stark con-
trast to the simple conceptualization imported
into management from financial economics, in
which the salient threat under such circum-
stances is firm liquidation, with residual cash
flows accruing only to shareholders. What
Libecap (1989) described is the process by which
enfranchised stakeholders renegotiate rather
than suffer the extreme consequence of shutting
down the firm.
Ostrom (1990) and Libecap (1989) offered exten-
sive insights about the specific resolution of
governance adaptation. In this article we do not
seek to describe comprehensively how specific
12While some economists focus on Ostrom’s (1990) design
rules as “equilibrium” outcomes, we emphasize how these
rules increase the likelihood of successful governance adap-
tation (e.g., through graduated sanctions and conflict reso-
lution mechanisms, such as arbitration and mediation
procedures).
13Libecap (1989) and Ostrom (1990) provided an array of de-
scriptive and prescriptive details, which is organized within
our proposed 2 3 2 and is intended as a complementary
framework to these seminal works. Whetten stated that “sen-
sitivity to the competing virtues of parsimony and compre-
hensiveness is the hallmark of a good theorist” (1989: 490), and
in this article we seek to achieve this balance.
14Ostrom described the following design principles as
shaping effective governance: “clear boundary and member-
ships; congruent rules; collective choice arenas; monitoring;
graduated sanctions; conflict resolution mechanisms; recog-
nized rights to organize; nested units” (1990: 190). We submit
that these elements of design emerge only after establishment
of the organization’s enfranchised stakeholders and the dis-
tribution of value through claimancy rights. Once these fun-
damental rules of governance arise, then organizational and
strategic choicesare enabled.Whenanorganization functions
well, these choices reflect Ostrom’s principles of effective
organizational design.
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adaptations proceed. Rather, we aim to partition
the types of adaptation into categories that reflect
the foundational elements of Ostrom’s and Libe-
cap’s insights: stakeholder enfranchisement and
claimancy rights. Focusing on these foundational
elements of governance produces an integrated
and bounded framework that categorizes gover-
nance adaptation based on enfranchisement and
claimancy rights. These categories illustrate
boundary conditions on the types of governance
outcomes that may arise, which we call “gover-
nance pathways.”
A FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURE ADAPTATION
How is governance adaptation initiated? Any
enfranchisedstakeholderperceivedas legitimate
can initiate the process. We submit that actors’
legitimacy tends to reflect the extent and impor-
tance of their specific investments of resources,
capabilities, time, responsibility, and/or commit-
ment in the organization (Blair & Stout, 1999). One
common impetus for initiating change is un-
certainty over the potential impact of shifts in the
EE on the rights and responsibilities of the most
enfranchised actors—a key challenge in the or-
ganization literature and government literature
(Mueller, 1989). For example, increases in global
competition, along with higher health care and
pension costs for retirees, ledGM in the late 2000s
to push for substantial reductions in labor costs.
The result was a two-day walkout by the United
AutomobileWorkers (UAW)Union in 2007, the first
strike against GM in nearly forty years. Eventu-
ally, the UAW membership ratified a landmark
456-page labor agreement with GM, which gave
control over retiree health costs to a UAW-
controlled trust fund (Lucas & Furdek, 2009).
The problem that the UAW and GM initially
sought to resolve related to governance over the
distribution of value arising from organizational
resources created after the company’s initial
success and, thus, not easily traceable to a par-
ticular shareholder group. GM was one of the
world’s largest and most successful companies,
with accrued brand capital, manufacturing ex-
pertise, anddesign capabilities that hademerged
over time from the course of the company’s oper-
ations. However, IE changes in trade policy, along
with changes in technology, consumer prefer-
ences, and health care costs, left the company
vulnerable to foreign competition and led to
a struggle among enfranchised stakeholders
about how the firm’s value could be protected.
This is a general challenge. Because at least
some of the common resources that may emerge
through organizational action may be impossible
to anticipate ex ante, governance activities need
continuous adaptation, even if the foundations of
governance do not change. At GM, changes in the
EE, coupled with stresses arising from governance
activities, led to questions about foundational en-
franchisement and claimancy rights. Under these
circumstances, the previously enfranchised stake-
holders initially sought renegotiation because of
FIGURE 1
Two Key Drivers of Organizational Governance Adaptation
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a shared perception that the gains from agreement
outweighed the gains from disagreement, in line
with Libecap (1989). To be sustainable, the adapted
governance structures must enable the creation of
sufficient value through joint production to com-
pensate each stakeholder group under the revised
termsofgovernance.Ultimately,GMcouldnotmeet
this threshold under the renegotiated agreements,
and thecompanyentered intobankruptcyon June1,
2009.
Once adaptation in governance begins, a wide
range of stakeholder groups may become en-
gaged. This occurs because organizations, like
institutional systems, involve the production and
use of collective resources, including both
common-pool resources and club goods.15 Be-
sides the usual problems of value creation and
value capture using the firm’s other resources,
special care must be taken to ensure that shared
resources are protected from value dissipation or
depletion during the renegotiation. As Libecap
(1989) submitted, differences in the information
possessed by stakeholders and distributional
conflicts result in divergence among bargaining
parties, which lowers the likelihood that the
existing arrangement will adapt.
As noted above, governance adaptation some-
times occurs when the development of new re-
sources and capabilities in an organization
renders the original governance structure in-
effective under the prevailing IE. For example, the
Partners In Health clinic in Haiti developed
a model of unprecedented productivity for treat-
ing ruralHIVpatientsbasedon theengagement of
community health workers. This new model,
which was celebrated around the world, consti-
tuted a significant breakthrough in the delivery of
health care to impoverished patients in rural
settings. As demands for disseminating this
model escalated, Partners In Health sought to
invest in its governance structures to support
growth (Kidder, 2004).
Governance adaptation is also affected by
claimancy rights embedded in the organization’s
governance structure. Changes in the IE may
embolden claims of inequity in the allocation of
the value created by an organization. In general,
the less clearly specified an organization’s
claimancy rules and the more these rules are
perceived to be inequitable, the less likely the
existing governance structure will resolve dis-
agreements. Similarly, when the resolution of
prior uncertainty in the IE leads to a skewed re-
alized distribution of wealth, then stakeholders
may seek to renegotiate the rules by which re-
sidual claims are distributed. Libecap’s (1989)
theory of adaptation explains the significance of
both stakeholder enfranchisementandclaimancy
rights to adaptation.On the one hand, shifts in the
IE raise the stakes for governance structure ad-
aptation by inviting enfranchisement and legiti-
mizing renegotiation of claimancy rights. On the
other hand, institutional change may lead to log-
jamming by vested interests and/or excessive
claims on the organization and, consequently,
may raise the specter of organizational failure.
Change inanorganization’s claimancy rights is
different from changes in the distribution that
occur as the result of exercise of the rules. For
example, at Bank One Corporation, in the year
after Jamie Dimon’s appointment as CEO in 2000,
the company’s senior executives did not receive
performance bonuses (Khurana, 2002). This dra-
matic action was viewed internally as a signifi-
cant step toward establishing a sense of urgency
for the turnaround that Dimon sought to lead, and
yet it did not constitute a change in claimancy
rights. By contrast, some actions that are viewed
within companies as not dramatic at all may
constitute changes in claimancy rights. Consider,
for example, when a company retires a class of
stock or when a school board changes its pro-
cedures to allow a panel of teachers to participate
in decisions regarding the budget designation of
a pool of funds for teacher salaries. Such actions
involve changes in claimancy rights that have
significant long-term implications for governance
structures but relatively little impact in the short
run on the actual claims that stakeholders make.
Generally, there are two sets of circumstances
in which IE change does not usually lead to
governance adaptation. The first is when the
anticipated benefits of change for the newly
enfranchised groups pushing for change are
perceived to be too small to justify the effort. The
second is when the required change is per-
ceived to be so great that the organization fails
entirely.
15As notedabove, common-pool resources are defined in the
public goods literature as goods that are rivalrous in con-
sumption but not excludable, leading to problems of over-
consumption. Goods that are excludable but nonrivalrous are
called “club goods”; here the canonical problem is under-
provision. Examples of firm-level club goods include patents,
standards, computer code, and other knowledge resources.
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On the first point, governance change is costly.
There are explicit costs for negotiating and
drafting new legal documents, adding or trans-
ferring personnel, and providing audits and re-
lated financial reports, as well implicit costs
associated with any firm-level change such as
overcoming inertia, placing stress on employees,
and so on (By, 2005; Fiss&Zajac, 2006).When these
costs are high, the perceived benefits from gov-
ernance adaptation must be high enough to mo-
tivate key stakeholders to bargain. For example,
Chrysler Corporation’s former CEO, Lee Iacocca,
extracted substantial wage and benefit conces-
sions from the UAW to stave off a bankruptcy
threat arising from the intense competition that
accompanied globalized trade in autos, espe-
cially during the 1970s and 1980s. The UAW
agreed to the concessions precisely because the
threat to the organization’s survival was signifi-
cant. The negotiations led by Iacocca also in-
corporated new governance arrangements that
enfranchised the UAW leader, Douglas Fraser, on
theChrysler board of directors. Thus, in exchange
for the concessions, theUAWand theworkers that
it represented had a voice in the strategy of the
firm (Reich, 1984).
There is no guarantee of success in negotia-
tions such as those at Chrysler. For example, in
2012 confectioner Hostess succumbed to bank-
ruptcy and liquidation after failed negotiations to
extract wage and benefit concessions from the
Bakers Union (Kelley, 2012), despite the threat to
the company arising from a cultural shift away
from consuming sugary treats.
In many cases, however, governance adaptation
proceeds successfully. Below we outline four path-
ways for governance adaptation and describe the
circumstances under which each is likely to occur.
PATHWAYS OF GOVERNANCE ADAPTATION
When changes in the EE are substantial and
unexpected, the organization’s initial governance
structure may no longer balance competing in-
terests of enfranchised stakeholders. How do
organizations adapt to maintain a viable gover-
nance structure? The conditions described in the
previous section help us to distinguish possible
scenarios.
We describe four pathways of governance ad-
aptation by interacting two sets of conditions de-
veloped above. Figure 2 illustrates these four
cases. The horizontal axis represents the
boundary cases on divergence in enfranchised
stakeholder interests, while the vertical axis
represents the boundary cases on claimancy
rights. We call the four pathways of governance
adaptation continuity, architectural change, en-
franchisement change, and redistribution. Each
pathway describes a potential path for gover-
nance adaptation; whether an organization will
adapt depends on strategy execution, organiza-
tional leadership, and the unique features of each
situation. On each path some firms may succeed
and others may fail. Below we provide some ex-
amples of successful and unsuccessful adapta-
tion along each pathway.
Continuity
When divergence in stakeholder interests is
low and claimancy rights are perceived to be eq-
uitable, governance structures adapt with conti-
nuity (see Figure 2). In this situation a change in
the IE requires changes that are perceived as
satisfactory (or equitable) by all parties. This, and
the fact that the divergence between stakeholder
interests is low (i.e., they have largely common
interests), implies that governance adaptation
can take place without a change in enfranchised
stakeholders or claimancy rights.
Continuity may arise even in the face of dra-
matic shifts in the IE. Consider, for example, the
impact of the 9/11 attacks on the governance pro-
tocols of New York’s money-center banks in en-
suring secure and authoritative control over
operations. To guard against potential disarray,
several banks strengthened and clarified rules of
institutional authority and chains of command
under various scenarios of disruption. The
change in the IE—namely, the 9/11 events—raised
the prospect of previously unimaginable threats.
By implementing new, contingent rules of gover-
nance, the banks adapted with continuity to pro-
tect enfranchised stakeholders and to preserve
claimancy rules.
Continuity is particularly likely when an orga-
nization’s established governance structures—
including claimancy rules—are well suited to
emergent resources that areaffectedby change in
the IE. For example, consider the evolution of
Facebook. Thegovernance structures established
upon the company’s initial public offering
evolved to address problems and issues that
arose during the Arab Spring—amajor change in
the IE. The evolution occurred with continuity,
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however: Facebook’s enfranchised stakeholders
clarified the implications of established gover-
nance rules without shifting claimancy rights.
In general, continuity tends to arise under the
following conditions:
• the initial governance structures accurately
anticipate the emergence of common-pool
resources;
• the organization creates enough value to
generate risk-adjusted returns on investment
satisfactory to each enfranchised stake-
holder with claimancy rights;
• the resolution of uncertainties regarding
value creation does not create disproportion-
ate burdens on particular stakeholders; and
• there are no major shocks or challenges to
the legitimacy of the value created by the
enterprise.
Architectural Change
An extreme alternative pathway arises when
an organization’s governance structures change
architecturally in the face of shifts in the IE. Con-
sider, for example, the Tohoku earthquake and
tsunami of 2011, which caused a disaster at the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant owned
by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO).
The prospect of liability claims, fueled by expec-
tations that the courts would find the company
negligent, led TEPCO to seek an infusion of cash
from the Japanese government in exchange for
partial nationalization and the inclusion of gov-
ernment officials on the top management team
and board (Obe, 2012). The transition involved
a tragically motivated recognition of the inter-
ests of all Japanese people in the company’s
operations—as well as a shift in claimancy rules
to reflect the devastating impact of the disaster on
the citizens of Fukushima Prefecture. The disaster
led to a shift in public opinion about who bears
responsibility for nuclear safety, which consti-
tuted a change in the IE that led to an important
change in governance.
FIGURE 2
Pathways of Governance Adaptation









change in rules of
enfranchisement or claims 
Examples: UAW works
with GM’s management
to ensure continuity of



























governance rules are reset;





18 JanuaryAcademy of Management Review
Here we suggest that when divergence of
stakeholder interests is high and when the
standing specification of claimancy rights is
perceived as inequitable, a comprehensive and
systemic adaptation will occur. We refer to this
adaptation as architectural change (see Figure 2).
Architectural changes occur when the estab-
lished governance structure is so significantly
inadequate to respond to changes in the IE that
the organization must be reconstituted differ-
ently. When architectural change succeeds, the
organization’s assets, capabilities, activities, and
routines become governed under new rules
designed to conform to the new IE. In other cases
the need for architectural change may result in
the failure of the organization entirely.
This form of change is difficult to accomplish
because it requires redesigning many elements
of a system simultaneously (Scott, 1987; Simon,
1962). The inability to adapt may lead to entirely
abandoning some elements of governance as
they fail in the face of unsuccessful negotiations
between groups of stakeholders with divergent
interests, and as the result of unsuccessful reso-
lution of rivalry over claimancy rights. What
emerges is a governance structure that may en-
franchise only a subgroup of the initial stake-
holders. Such a situation arises under the
following kinds of conditions:
• the initial structures of governance are con-
structed under considerable uncertainty
about forthcoming shifts in the IE, which may
lead to claims by initially disenfranchised
stakeholder groups;
• the value created by the organization is only
marginally sufficient to compensate enfran-
chised stakeholders with claimancy rights
abovewhat theywould receive if theywere to
pursue outside options;
• the common-pool resources that arise have
value to only a small group of stakeholders;
• disenfranchised stakeholders make strong,
legitimate claims on the activities of the or-
ganization; and
• the resolution of uncertainties regarding
value creation does not create dispropor-
tionate burdens on particular stakeholders.
The De Beers case discussed above represents
a case of successful architectural adaptation. The
existing rules of stakeholder enfranchisement—
which largelyexcludedmost of the local population
from equity ownership, senior management posi-
tions, and exercises of decision authority—were
renegotiated. The old rules of distribution—which
were perceived to be highly inequitable—were
restructured to give a greater share of firm value to
nonwhite stakeholders. The IE change in this case
was the end of the apartheid system. The post-
apartheid Black Economic Empowerment act re-
quiredmining companies such as De Beers to have
15 percent black ownership by 2005. The result was
a radically restructured De Beers, in which estab-
lished resources and capabilities were deployed
under a new governance structure.
In some cases successful architectural change
is initiated from within the organization, such as
when a company seeks to be restructured or ac-
quired for access to the governance structure of the
new parent or combined firm. Consider, for exam-
ple, a leveraged buyout by management of a com-
pany, such as occurred at Dollar General in 2007
(Roe, 2013). Former investors willingly became dis-
enfranchised through the sale of their shares to
management. This transfer of ownership also
changes the rules of claimancy by providing those
managers who buy with residual rights and with
enhanced authority to change compensation sys-
tems. At Dollar General such an architectural
change in governance occurred because of negoti-
ations between enfranchised stakeholders, rather
than fiat from an external authority.
In other cases, however, architectural change is
so daunting that the result is organizational col-
lapse, despite attempts by external authorities to
mitigate conflicts. Consider, for example, the ef-
fect of partial deregulation in the trading of U.S.
energycontractsand the infamous failureofEnron.
Because Enron’s governance structures were not
adapted to reflect the interests of previously dis-
enfranchised groups of stakeholders—in particu-
lar, the citizens of California—the company’s
traders engaged in practices that led to energy
shortages and blackouts there (McLean & Elkind,
2003). Negotiations over rules of claimancy on the
company failed, in part, because profits from
trading had been disbursed in bonus compensa-
tion packages to senior employees and traders,
thus leaving the company with insufficient funds
to compensate stakeholders with claims that were
eventually adjudicated in the IE as legitimate.
Libecap (1989) considered two key cases of suc-
cessful and unsuccessful architectural change.
The first was the carefully studied case ofmineral
rights in the American West. The landowners
believed they owned property under which these
valuable minerals were buried, but none of them
knew precisely where the minerals lay. To avoid
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duplicative exploratory and extractive digging,
and to avoid flooding the market with minerals,
landowners cooperated to manage exploration,
extraction, and sale. In other words, they renego-
tiated their stakeholder rights from an individual
to shared model, while agreeing to distribute
claims evenly across landholders. Continuous im-
provements in rules governing the underground
boundaries of mineral veins were established to
protect property holdings (Libecap 1978). The con-
tinuity in governance rules arose because each of
the landowners realized that the loss of some
individual rights through cooperation would
yield a greater return than from uncoordinated
competition.
Architectural change in this case was successful
for the reasons described by Libecap’s (1989) five
factors. First, the expected aggregate gains from
establishing secure private property rights were
large (Bromley, 1989). Second, the number of con-
tracting parties among landowners was typically
small—in the range of twenty to thirty individuals
(Libecap, 1989). Third, the groups were relatively
homogeneous with respect to experiences and ex-
pectations regarding legal institutions (Hallagan,
1978). Fourth, asymmetric information problems
were low—that is, information was similarly dis-
tributed among the contracting parties (Olson, 1982).
Fifth, most of the contracting parties expected a
share in the large, aggregate economic gains from
establishing these property rights (Umbeck, 1977).
Therefore, despite the potential private gains that
each landowner might obtain by defecting from the
group, the gains to the group that accrued from the
coordination of mining effort were so great that
each miner cooperated.
Libecap’s (1989) second IE-level example con-
cerned an architectural change that was too diffi-
cult and where existing arrangements fell apart.
This problem arose among landowners seeking to
extract oil from a newly discovered common oil
field. In this example, landowners who had settled
inparticularareas received theunanticipatednews
of valuable, extractable oil under their land. Land
over subsurface oil reservoirs in the United States
often hasmultiple owners. The oil ismigratory and
canmovewithinareservoir, soa landownerdrilling
on their own land can extract oil that was under
a neighbor’s land (McDonald, 1971). In Texas, land-
owners may drill a well on their land and drain
oil and gas from neighbors without liability
(Lueck, 1995), since property rights to oil and
gas are assigned upon extraction. However, by
collaborating, neighbors with land over the
common oil field can achieve greater returns
than by competing. This arrangement, called
“unitization,” occurs when a single drill is con-
structed to extract oil at a rate that is negotiated
among the neighbors; the profits are then split in
proportion to each landholder’s share. Through
such collaboration the neighbors not only avoid
the duplicative and technical costs of multiple
drills (Smith, 1987) but also do not compete to
drive down the local price of extracted oil, thus
raising joint profits (Kim & Mahoney, 2002).
The economic gains from oil field unitization
have been understood since the first oil discovery
in the United States—in Pennsylvania in 1859. Yet
we observe a surprisingly low rate of oil field
unitization, particularly in Texas (Bain, 1947;
Weaver, 1986). To understand why, consider the
contractual impediments to achieving oil field
unitization. First, gains from unitization are
especially low when many parties have large
holdings (e.g., sometimes with hundreds of
owners; Libecap & Smith, 2001). Second, con-
tracting parties tend to be heterogeneous
(e.g., some parties primarily own oil and others
gas). Third, uncertainty and asymmetric in-
formation lead to diverse valuations of each con-
tracting party’s shares. Because each contracting
party undertakes calculations by doing tests
based on its own land, with a limited number of
observations as well as bores, it is not surprising
that calculations vary across different parties
(Libecap & Wiggins, 1984).
The success or failure of architectural change
depends largely on the strength of interest groups
(Eggertsson, 1990; Olson, 1982), and the problems
identified in the “rent-seeking” literature
(Krueger, 1974; Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1993)
provide key insights for explaining why an in-
efficient outcome persists.16 Demsetz’s (1967)
16Although beyond the scope of this article, there are im-
portant sociological factors influencing interest group forma-
tion, such as the development and elaboration of collective
action frames as meaning construction, problem identifica-
tion, frame diffusion, and collective identity, as well as con-
textual constraints and facilitation (e.g., political opportunity
structureand cultural constraints andopportunities; Benford&
Snow, 2000). Building on this research, Henisz and Zelner (2005)
emphasized the impact of cognitive limitations by various
stakeholders and varying normative pressures, institutional
constraints, and social influences on effective change as an
ongoingprocess at both the level of governance structures and
institutional arrangements at the IE level.
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optimistic view of the evolution of property rights
toward efficiency implicitly posits that govern-
ments will typically act to minimize transaction
costs. In the case of oil field unitization in the
United States, this premise did not hold, and
some government decision makers had economic
incentives to maintain the status quo (Libecap,
1989). Further, political processes in contracting
for property rights also are prone to free-riding
problems in group decision-making processes
(Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990).
Enfranchisement Change
Between the two extremes of continuity and
architectural change are two pathways of gover-
nance adaptation that have been underexplored
in prior literature: stakeholder enfranchisement
change and redistribution. Enfranchisement
change occurs when divergence in stakeholder
interests is high, yet, post change, claimancy
rights are seen as equitable (see Figure 2). In this
case the key to adaptation is to let new stake-
holders in and/or remove other stakeholders. En-
franchisement change reflects an adaptation in
the groups of stakeholders with rights in an or-
ganization’s governance structure, including de-
cision rules, managerial rights, and reporting
procedures. Rules of claimancy are not adjusted,
but groups of stakeholders are either excluded or
included in the organization’s governance. Such
enfranchisement change may also involve imple-
mentation of eligibility for claimancy but not
change the rules by which claimancy occurs. In
some cases enfranchisement may occur without
providing any claimancy rights, such as when
a company creates a program for volunteers or
when it seeks theadviceof communitymembers in
governance decisions. When organizations create
noncompensatory partnership arrangements and
memos of understanding that influence gover-
nance, they are on a pathway of enfranchisement
change.
Enfranchisement change is common. When-
ever a publicly traded company creates a part-
nership agreement or a merger that gives the
target entity a voice in governance, then enfran-
chisement change occurs. It is important to note
that thispathwayexcludescaseswhereclaimancy
rights also change. For example, enfranchisement
change occurs when a small, venture-backed
entrepreneurial organization establishes a new
partnership agreement that does not change or
dilute the claimancy rights of the management
team or the venture backers. By contrast, architec-
tural change occurs when the same organization’s
partnership agreement influences the distribution
agreements.
Enfranchisement change may be subtle. The
threshold criterion for its occurrence is change in
the ownership and control rights that shape the
organization’s core activities. Science-based
pharmaceutical companies have created advi-
sory boards that reflect the health requirements,
medical infrastructure, and legal positions of ju-
risdictions that may seek access to medicines.
Open-source software development companies
create panels to represent the interests of poten-
tial customers and to advise participants on
technical and legal issues regarding the com-
mercialization of applicationsbuilt on thegeneral
purpose technology. Each of these examples
represents change designed to enfranchise
stakeholder groups without a wholesale re-
constitution of the organization’s claimancy
rights.
In some instances organizations adapt gover-
nance structures by excluding previously en-
franchised stakeholder groups. Spin-outs may
occur as stakeholder groups pursue outside gov-
ernance options, such aswhen JohnWarnock and
ChuckGeschke left the XeroxCorporation to form
Adobe after Xerox declined to invest in the tec-
hnology that subsequently became PostScript
(Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). In some cases
stakeholder groups are forced out of companies;
hostile takeover bids and leveraged buyouts fre-
quently lead to the departure of large groups of
managers under restructuring actions designed
to make companies more efficient (Krug &
Hegarty, 1997). Less contentiousness adaptation
may also occur as groups of stakeholders are
enfranchised in management decisions. These
examples represent sometimes dramatically dif-
ferent decision-making and managerial systems,
but the initial organizational governance struc-
ture retains its identity.
Conditions that tend to favor stakeholder en-
franchisement change include the following:
• the operations of the organization under the
initial governance structure reveal the legit-
imate claims of previously disenfranchised
stakeholders;
• a group of enfranchised stakeholders seeks
exit from the responsibilities of governance
because of revealed outside alternatives that
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are more economically attractive than con-
tinued engagement;
• internal disagreements between stakeholder
groups about resource allocation decisions
raise the costs of collaboration, leading some
groups to seek exit; and
• the emergence of organizational resources
imposes costs on stakeholders, leading to
requirements for adjustment.
Redistribution
The fourth pathway involves changing the
terms by which groups of stakeholders claim
value from the organization. Such changes are
called “redistributive” because they are zero sum:
when one stakeholder group, such as employees,
wins the right to a greater claim on an organiza-
tion’s value than it previously had, then, de facto,
some other stakeholder group loses the claim.
Redistribution occurs when divergence in stake-
holder interests is low yet the rules by which re-
sidual claims are distributed are perceived to be
inequitable (see Figure 2).
Redistribution may occur when those already
enfranchised within an organization’s gover-
nance model seek to avert a disruption by volun-
tarily giving up some of their rights. The idea that
those in power would voluntarily waive some of
their property rights to preserve or even increase
their wealth is well established (Blair & Stout,
1999; Schelling, 1960). For example, Alexy and
Reitzig (2013) showed empirically that environ-
mental shocks can be triggers for an innovative
firm towaive its exclusion rights for thepurposeof
coordinatingamongseveral participants,which can
enable them to jointly design industry-regulating
institutions to facilitate economic value capture.
Thus, gaining (de facto) control over a resourcemay
come about by giving (formal) control away.
Examples of changes in claimancy rights are
also relatively common. Consider the minimill
steel business of Nucor, which gives substantial
autonomy to its operating divisions (Ghemawat,
1995). Originally, the compensation of Nucor’s
executives was tied to the performance of the in-
dividual divisions. This arrangementworkedwell
when the prevailing technology for operating
each division was the blast furnace, since the
geographic footprints of the divisions were dif-
ferent. However, the emergence of minimill
technology—a shift in the technological part of
the EE—put Nucor on a redistribution pathway.
Because minimills allowed each Nucor division
to compete fiercely in geographic territories that
had been dominated previously by other Nucor
divisions, the company was thrown into a gover-
nance crisis. To resolve the problem, the company
adapted its claimancy rules so that executive pay
would reflect overall corporate performance,
rather than divisional performance. This change
in claimancy rights created a powerful incentive
for cooperation among the divisional executives.
Nucor’s governance structure was adapted to al-
low greater claimancy rights within the di-
visions on economic value created at the level
of the corporation. Thus, divisional managers’
compensationwas based on corporate return on
equity, which aligned the incentives of busi-
ness division-level strategy and corporate-level
strategy (Ghemawat, 1995).
Conditions under which redistribution tends to
arise include the following:
• the resolution of initial uncertainties about
the creation of value reveals that a stake-
holder group’s costs or benefits are dispro-
portionately out of alignment with those
anticipated;
• the outside opportunities of one or more
stakeholder groups change in relationship to
those of other stakeholder groups; and
• the resourcesheldby theorganization, and/or
the opportunities it faces, require dispropor-
tionate investment by one or more enfran-
chised stakeholder groups.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Governance structuresmust adapt to the IE if an
organization is to survive. This is especially true
when the changes arise in the firm’s IE. In this
article we have provided a general framework for
governance adaptation describing how parties in
an organization attempt to resolve conflicts over
the value cocreated from shared resources. Our
framework builds on the institutional economics
literature on collective goods because negotiating
organizational governance structures is a prob-
lem of aligning stakeholder interests for joint
production—the same problem studied by Ostrom
and Libecap. Ostrom (1990) described conditions
under which parties can resolve conflicts over
shared resources when parties have differing
goals, interests, bargaining strength, and beliefs
about what they deserve. Libecap (1989) showed
how characteristics of the bargaining parties and
the economic value of the underlying resources
affect the ability to arrive at different solutions.
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Conflicts over shared resources boil down to
disagreements about who is in and who is out,
which we call enfranchisement, and who gets
what, which we call claimancy. As we discussed
above, enfranchisement and claimancy are sim-
ilar to the organizational economics and corpo-
rate finance concepts of decision rights and cash
flow rights, respectively, but they go beyond effi-
ciency to include considerations of distribution
and fairness. We described four pathways of
governance adaptation determined by the di-
vergence of interest among enfranchised stake-
holders and the degree to which claims on firm
value are perceived to be equitable.
The first contributionemerging fromouranalysis is
the two parallel arguments regarding drivers of gov-
ernance adaptation at the level of the organization.
Our first argument emphasizes divergence in stake-
holder interests, while the second focuses on
claimancy rights. By distinguishing between
the foundations of governance—namely, stake-
holder enfranchisement and claimancy—and gov-
ernanceactivities,weseek toclarifyandsimplify the
canonical problem of governance adaptation. Each
stakeholder group considers the impact of a change
in the EE on the organization’s standing governance
structure. A critical point in the development of our
theory is that the transition by organizations in con-
fronting increasingly challenging collective action
problemscreates conditions that tend to enfranchise
new stakeholders and to impact claimancy rights.
We next specified four pathways of governance
adaptation—continuity, architectural change, en-
franchisement change, and redistribution—that
reflect boundary conditions established by our
arguments. These pathways provide a taxonomy
for researchers seeking to understand organiza-
tional change; they may also be useful to practi-
tioners seeking to address the implications of
changes in the EE for governance.
Our theory also demonstrates several ways the
EE—the IE in particular—and the organization
interact. For instance, organizational governance
structures reflect the legal, political, social, and
cultural rules established by the IE, thus pro-
viding the backdrop against which organiza-
tional governance operates. Stakeholders may
revert formallyor informally to the IE toadjudicate
claims on organizational governance.
Finally, the process of governance adaptation
in organizations is analogous to institutional
(property rights) arrangement adaptation at the
level of the IE. Consequently, we identify
a substantial overlap of Williamson’s (1985)
mechanisms of governance at the organization
level and Ostrom’s (1990) institutional design
principles at the institutional level as means of
attenuating these collective-action problems
(e.g., monitoring and dispute resolution mecha-
nisms). However, as noted, both organizational
and institutional adaptation—when architec-
tural change is required—are difficult.
Our analysis points to several opportunities for
further research. First, the microprocess of en-
dogenously driven governance structure change
needs greater attention. Consider Williamson’s
(1985) concept of the “fundamental trans-
formation,” which describes how economic
relationships change over time as relationship-
specific investments aremade. This logic applies
to shared resources and collective action. Agree-
ments to share common-pool resources may ini-
tially be effective but may deteriorate as the
specific investments weaken the bargaining po-
sitions of parties, leading to costly renegotiation.
The fundamental transformation at the gover-
nance level has a parallel application at the in-
stitutional level—for example, as in Vernon’s
(1977) “obsolescing bargain model” (see Bucheli
& Kim, 2015, and Nygaard & Dahlstrom, 1992). In-
sights derived from these and especially socio-
logical theories of process changewouldadvance
understanding of governance adaptation.
Second, an important opportunity arises in un-
derstanding the capabilities required both for
effective governance and effective governance
adaptation. The management literature empha-
sizes that organizational capabilities to write
and enforce effective contracts develop over time,
as contracting parties experiment and learn
(Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Mayer & Argyres, 2004).
Thus, even after effective governance mecha-
nisms for sharing common-pool resources have
emerged, there is the potential for ex post oppor-
tunism if the exchange parties subsequently
make relationship-specific investments. In other
words, while we focus mainly on applying in-
sights from the institutional (property rights)
arrangement literature to the organizational
governance structure literature, the institutional
governance literature can also benefit from con-
sidering core concepts from organization theory,
beyond our modified variant of contingency
theory.
Third, additional research is required on the
implications for organizational governance
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structure adaptation of relationships between
organizations in the IE. Examining interactions
among and between organizational governance
structures would illuminate the social and politi-
cal relevance of organizational research (Klein,
Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2013) and would
clarify how norms, rules, expectations, and risk
tolerance in the IE change. Explicating these
interactions more systematically can provide
guidance for managers operating across in-
stitutional contexts and within dynamic compet-
itive landscapes. Not onlywill examination of this
interplay inspire substantial empirical testing
but it will also generate multilevel theory devel-
opment to explore parallels between organiza-
tional governance mechanisms and institutional
design principles that benefit both management
and global business research.17
Fourth, there is scope for clarifying the relation-
ships between stakeholders within the IE and orga-
nizational governance structure change using a
formal model. This approach can also enable us to
distinguish cases in which effective rules for gov-
erning shared resources emerge endogenously
(e.g., by a firm’s strategic behaviors, such as lobby-
ing to change the IE [Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Holburn &
VandenBergh, 2008]) fromcases inwhichagivenset
of smooth governance structure rules must adapt to
shifts in the IE (which has been our focus in this ar-
ticle). A formal model would also shed light on the
speed with which such adaptations take place.
Fifth, our illustrations suggest important ques-
tions that must be addressed empirically. Large-
sample datasets that reflect governance structure
change would yield important insights about the
designprinciples thatgovern interaction.Theremay
be contexts, such as public-private procurement ar-
rangements (Quelin,Cabral,Lazzarini,&Kivleniece,
2014), where detailed information about sharing
rules can be extracted from survey data. Additional
qualitative assessments are certainly warranted.
Over the long run, a panel dataset that includes in-
formation about both the IE and organizational
governance would yield important insights about
governance structure change and its consequence.
Sixth, an analysis of the expected influence of IE
change on organizational governance structures
through its impact on organizational actors and dy-
namics can help managers anticipate and mold
changeat the IE level, aswell as the fit between the IE
level and organizational governance structures. This
modified variant of contingency theory can thus aid
managerialpractice tohelp fosterefficientadaptation.
Finally, additional research is required on fair-
ness, equity, justice, and legitimacy (Meyer, Boli,
Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997; Oliver, 1992) as outcomes
of organizational governance adaptation. These
important criteria for the resolution of intercoali-
tional conflict must be considered as institutional
innovations and organizational governance struc-
ture changes are implemented. This is particularly
relevant for complex interactions among public and
private actors on issues such as health care reform
andenvironmentalpolicy.AsKinzigetal. (2013)have
noted, solving such “wicked problems” involves not
only changes in personal and social norms but also
specific governance mechanisms (e.g., regulations
and financial interventions) that interactwith norms
incomplexandhard-to-predictways. Inotherwords,
adaptations at different institutional levels work to-
gether, not independently. For management schol-
arship this interdependence suggests that closer
attention to mechanisms and processes of insti-
tutional change may yield a better understanding
of organizational governance.
While we have focused primarily on applying
insights from the institutional governance litera-
ture to informmanagement research and practice,
the analysis suggests that careful consideration of
organizational governance—aswell as of strategy
and entrepreneurship—can deepen our under-
standing of institutional problems. Just as organi-
zational stakeholders choose whether to initiate,
support, or resist organizational change based
partly on their beliefs about how much value will
be createdandhowmuch they canappropriate, so,
too, does social andpolitical changedependon the
beliefs of key participants about social and politi-
cal value creation and value capture. Further ex-
ploration is needed to evaluate whether andwhen
such coadaptation fosters efficient and effective
governance of the IE, in contrast to the capture of
the IE by organizational actors who seek to ex-
clude particular stakeholders.
The results of themodified variant of contingency
theory developed here also suggest that change in
the IE and the adaptive responses in organizational
governance structures that result may create new
17The common-pool resource institutional research litera-
ture often neglects some of Williamson’s (1996) governance
mechanisms, such as mutual commitment, while the gover-
nance structure literature often neglects some of Ostrom’s
(1990) institutional design principles, such as graduated
sanctions and peer monitoring. Thus, a synthesis of design
solutions is a contribution to both theory and practice.
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opportunities fordeployingemergentorganizational
resources for value creation. Ultimately, the realiza-
tion of a society’s most important economic op-
portunities to innovate depends on the alignment
between the rules and norms that prevail in the IE
and organizational governance structures.
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